Assignment Judge: Linda R. Feinberg
Hours of Operation
Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

Mailing Address:
Mercer County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068 Trenton, NJ 08650-0068
(609) 571-4000

Linda R. Feinberg, Assignment Judge  The Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, assisted by the Administrative Director of the Courts, is responsible for the administration of all courts in the state. The state is divided into fifteen judicial districts, referred to as vicinages. Mercer County is designated as Vicinage 7. A chief judge, known as an Assignment Judge, is responsible for leadership of the vicinage. Assisting in this process, are four Presiding Judges, who supervise the day-to-day operations of the Criminal, Civil, Family and General Equity Divisions.
on September 24 Judge Feinberg, "with great reluctance,"
orally ordered the plaintiffs not to release the report on October
2nd, and not to publicly discuss their conclusions from the study. She
did so after the attorney for Sequoia grossly mischaracterized our
report. In order to respect the Judge's temporary stay, I cannot now
comment further on what the report does contain.

The plaintiffs are deeply troubled by the Court's issuance of what is
essentially a temporary restraining order restricting speech, without
any motion or briefing whatsoever. Issuing such an order is an extreme
measure, which should be done only in rare circumstances, and only if
the moving party has satisfied its high burden of showing both
imminent harm and likelihood of success on the merits. Those two
requirements have not been satisfied, nor can they be.

Andrew Appel
 I was surprised at how simple it was for me to access the ROM memory chips containing the firmware that controls the vote-counting. Contrary to Sequoia's assertions in their promotional literature, there were no security seals protecting the ROMs. Indeed, I found that certain information in the "AVC Advantage Security Overview" (from Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc., 2004) was untrue with respect to my machine. Sequoia's document states, The vote counting instructions in each voting machine are written into integrated circuit chips during the manufacturing process. These chips are incorporated into each machine's circuit boards. Access to the machine should be limited by administrative procedures and is also limited by the physical design of the machines. Design features include door locks and a numbered seal on the CPU cover.
I found this to be incorrect, with respect to the machines delivered to me. I did not have to remove any seals, whether of tape, plastic, or wire. The sheet-metal panel covering the computer circuit board is the only component I found that could possibly be described as a "CPU cover", and it had no numbered seal. (If there ever was a numbered seal holding the CPU cover down, then Buncombe County's technicians would have to remove it and replace it every time they change the four AA batteries on the motherboard!)
The AVC Advantage can be easily manipulated to throw an election because the chips which control the vote-counting are not soldered on to the circuit board of the DRE. This means the vote-counting firmware can be removed and replace with fraudulent firmware. Under the sheet-metal panel (the "CPU cover"), I found the circuit board containing computer chips, other electronic chips, and four chips that--unlike most of the chips on the circuit board which are soldered in place--are mounted in sockets so that they can be removed and replaced. These are ROM (read-only memory) chips that hold the computer program (firmware) that operates the voting logic. These chips are not held in place by any seals. They can be removed using an ordinary screwdriver and they (or other ROM chips containing other firmware) can be replaced simply by pressing them into place. You can see the ROM chips in the picture above; they have the white labels pasted onto them, and you can see me in the process of prying one loose with a screwdriver.
Like the purchasers of all the other lots sold by Buncombe County, I am now at leisure to examine the contents of the firmware on the ROM chips, and to modify it. If I had the inclination to cheat in an election (which I do not) I could prepare a modified version of the firmware that subtly alters votes as the votes are cast, with no indication of the alteration made visible to the voter. I would write this modified firmware onto new ROM chips. Then, if I had access to one of New Jersey's voting machines (for example, in an elementary school or firehouse where it is left unattended the night before an election), I could open the door of the machine, unscrew 10 screws, replace the legitimate ROM chips with my own fraudulent ones, reinstall the cover panel with its 10 screws, and close the door of the machine.
Here is the affadavit that I wrote, describing my purchase of these machines, for the Superior Court of New Jersey in the New Jersey Voting Machines Lawsuit.